Research Topics
| M A NowakSummaryAffiliation: Institute for Advanced Study Country: USA Publications
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Detail Information
Publications
The evolution of languageM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 96:8028-33. 1999..We argue that grammar originated as a simplified rule system that evolved by natural selection to reduce mistakes in communication. Our theory provides a systematic approach for thinking about the origin and evolution of human language...
Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum gameM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Science 289:1773-5. 2000..We show that fairness will evolve if the proposer can obtain some information on what deals the responder has accepted in the past. Hence, the evolution of fairness, similarly to the evolution of cooperation, is linked to reputation...
Evolution of universal grammarM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Science 291:114-8. 2001..We calculate the condition under which natural selection favors the emergence of rule-based, generative grammars that underlie complex language...
Evolutionary biology of languageM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 355:1615-22. 2000..I will discuss how natural selection can lead to the emergence of arbitrary signs, the formation of words and syntactic communication...
The evolution of syntactic communicationM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, USA
Nature 404:495-8. 2000..This result might explain why only humans evolved syntactic communication and hence complex language...
Computational and evolutionary aspects of languageMartin A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, USA
Nature 417:611-7. 2002..Universal grammar specifies the restricted set of languages learnable by the human brain. Evolutionary dynamics can be formulated to describe the cultural evolution of language and the biological evolution of universal grammar...
The role of chromosomal instability in tumor initiationMartin A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 99:16226-31. 2002..Specifically, we calculate the conditions for CIN to initiate the process of colorectal tumorigenesis before the inactivation of tumor suppressor genes...
The evolutionary language gameM A Nowak
Institute for Advanced Study, Olden Lane, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 200:147-62. 1999..Mistakes increase the overall efficacy of parental and role model learning: in a world with errors evolutionary adaptation is more efficient. Our model also provides a simple explanation why homonomy is common while synonymy is rare...
A new theory of cytotoxic T-lymphocyte memory: implications for HIV treatmentD Wodarz
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 355:329-43. 2000..Based on our models we suggest conceptual treatment regimes which ensure establishment of CTL memory. This would allow the immune response to control HIV in the long term in the absence of continued therapy...
The evolutionary dynamics of grammar acquisitionN L Komarova
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 209:43-59. 2001..We calculate the maximum size of the search space that is compatible with coherent communication in a population. Thus, we specify the conditions for the evolution of universal grammar...
Natural selection of the critical period for language acquisitionN L Komarova
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Biol Sci 268:1189-96. 2001..This result is obtained analytically by means of a Nash equilibrium analysis of language acquisition devices. Interestingly, the evolutionarily stable learning period does not maximize the average fitness of the population...
Correlates of cytotoxic T-lymphocyte-mediated virus control: implications for immunosuppressive infections and their treatmentD Wodarz
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 355:1059-70. 2000..We show how mathematical models can help us devise therapy regimens that can restore CTL memory in HIV patients and result in long-term immunological control of the virus in the absence of life-long treatment...
HIV-1 dynamics revisited: biphasic decay by cytotoxic T lymphocyte killing?R A Arnaout
Theoretical Biology Program, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Biol Sci 267:1347-54. 2000..We propose a method to test this idea, and develop a framework that is readily applicable to treatment of other infections...
Specific therapy regimes could lead to long-term immunological control of HIVD Wodarz
Institute for Advanced Study, Olden Lane, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 96:14464-9. 1999..Whether such treatment regimes would lead to long-term immunologic control deserves investigation under carefully controlled conditions...
Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language gameP E Trapa
School of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
J Math Biol 41:172-88. 2000....
The evolutionary dynamics of the lexical matrixN L Komarova
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Bull Math Biol 63:451-84. 2001..Our analytic investigations are supplemented by numerical simulations that describe both incomplete and incorrect learning, and other extensions...
Evolutionary dynamics of HIV-induced subversion of the immune responseD Wodarz
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Immunol Rev 168:75-89. 1999..These insights are important for understanding the disease process itself and for designing effective treatment regimes...
The spatial ultimatum gameK M Page
Institute for Advanced Study, 310 Olden Lane, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Biol Sci 267:2177-82. 2000..We first show that in a non-spatial setting, natural selection chooses the unfair, rational solution. In a spatial setting, however, much fairer outcomes evolve...
Mutation-selection networks of cancer initiation: tumor suppressor genes and chromosomal instabilityNatalia L Komarova
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 223:433-50. 2003..In this case, CIN is an early event and a driving force of cancer progression. The techniques developed in this paper can be used to study arbitrarily complex mutation-selection networks of the somatic evolution of cancer...
Dynamics of genetic instability in sporadic and familial colorectal cancerNatalia L Komarova
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, USA
Cancer Biol Ther 1:685-92. 2002..For a wide range of parameter values, we find support for the radical hypothesis that genetic instability initiates colonic tumorigenesis. We compare sporadic and hereditary forms of colorectal cancer...
Competitive exclusion and coexistence of universal grammarsW Garrett Mitchener
Program in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Fine Hall, Washington Road, Princeton, NJ 08544 1000, USA
Bull Math Biol 65:67-93. 2003..An interesting finding is that less specific UGs can resist invasion by more specific UGs if learning is more accurate. In other words, accurate learning stabilizes UGs that admit large numbers of candidate grammars...
The different effects of apoptosis and DNA repair on tumorigenesisJoshua B Plotkin
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 214:453-67. 2002..We find that the loss of DNA repair or the loss of apoptosis both hasten tumorigenesis, but in characteristically different ways...
Language evolution and information theoryJ B Plotkin
Institut for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 205:147-59. 2000..We develop a general model of word formation and demonstrate the connection between the error limit and Shannon's noisy coding theorem...
Adherence and drug resistance: predictions for therapy outcomeL M Wahl
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Biol Sci 267:835-43. 2000..We derive results specific to the treatment of human immunodeficiency virus infection, but emphasize that our method is applicable to a range of viral or other infections treated by chemotherapy...
A generalized adaptive dynamics framework can describe the evolutionary Ultimatum GameK M Page
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
J Theor Biol 209:173-9. 2001..This approach can describe the long-term dynamics of the Ultimatum Game and also explain the evolution of fairness in a one-parameter Ultimatum Game...
Evolutionary preservation of redundant duplicated genesD C Krakauer
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Semin Cell Dev Biol 10:555-9. 1999..In all cases, some form of symmetry breaking is required to maintain functional redundancy indefinitely...
Chaos and languageW Garrett Mitchener
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, New Jersey, USA
Proc Biol Sci 271:701-4. 2004..Hence, language dynamical equations mimic complicated and unpredictable changes of languages over time. In terms of evolutionary game theory, we note that imperfect learning can induce chaotic switching among strict Nash equilibria...
Cytotoxic T-cell abundance and virus load in human immunodeficiency virus type 1 and human T-cell leukaemia virus type 1D Wodarz
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
Proc Biol Sci 268:1215-21. 2001..Virus-mediated impairment of specific CTL production in HIV-1 infection can account for the negative correlation observed...
Unifying evolutionary dynamicsKaren M Page
Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ, 08540, U S A
J Theor Biol 219:93-8. 2002..From these equations, we obtain as special cases adaptive dynamics, evolutionary game dynamics, the Lotka-Volterra equation of ecology and the quasispecies equation of molecular evolution...
Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishmentChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Science 316:1905-7. 2007..Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation...
Genetic progression and the waiting time to cancerNiko Beerenwinkel
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
PLoS Comput Biol 3:e225. 2007..The complexity of cancer progression can be understood as the result of multiple sequential mutations, each of which has a relatively small but positive effect on net cell growth...
Evolutionary dynamics of tumor suppressor gene inactivationMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 101:10635-8. 2004..Small lesions without genetic instability can take a very long time to inactivate the next TSG, whereas the same lesions with genetic instability pose a much greater risk for cancer progression...
Win-stay, lose-shift in language learning from peersFrederick A Matsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 101:18053-7. 2004..Moreover, for many graphs, it is sufficient to have an aspiration level demanding only two other individuals to use the same language...
Can chromosomal instability initiate tumorigenesis?Franziska Michor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Semin Cancer Biol 15:43-9. 2005..If two tumor suppressor genes have to be inactivated in rate-limiting steps, then CIN is likely to emerge before the inactivation of the first tumor suppressor gene...
Population genetics of tumor suppressor genesYoh Iwasa
Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Hakozoki 6 10 1, Higashi ku, Fukuoka 812 8581, Japan
J Theor Biol 233:15-23. 2005..The inactivation of the first and of the second allele can occur at equal or different rates. Our calculations provide insights into basic aspects of population genetics determining cancer initiation and progression...
Stochastic dynamics of metastasis formationFranziska Michor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 240:521-30. 2006..Our theory shows how to calculate the expected number of metastases that are formed by a tumor...
Genetic instability and clonal expansionMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 241:26-32. 2006....
Evolution of resistance during clonal expansionYoh Iwasa
Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
Genetics 172:2557-66. 2006..Hence a tumor subject to high rates of apoptosis will show a higher incidence of resistance than expected on its detection size only...
A symmetry of fixation times in evoultionary dynamicsChristine Taylor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 243:245-51. 2006..This does not hold for Wright-Fisher models, nor when the mutants start from multiple copies...
The one-third law of evolutionary dynamicsHisashi Ohtsuki
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 249:289-95. 2007..We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive...
Evolutionary games on cyclesHisashi Ohtsuki
Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan
Proc Biol Sci 273:2249-56. 2006..In this setting, all three update rules lead to identical conditions in the limit of weak selection, where we find the '1/3-law' of well-mixed populations...
Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selectionArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 244:349-56. 2007..A simple mean-field approximation is derived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity. Correction terms to the mean-field theory are computed and discussed...
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutationDrew Fudenberg
Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Theor Popul Biol 70:352-63. 2006..We determine which language will be spoken in finite large populations. The results have an intuitive interpretation but would not be expected from an analysis of the replicator dynamics...
Stochastic tunnels in evolutionary dynamicsYoh Iwasa
Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812 8581, Japan
Genetics 166:1571-9. 2004..Although our theory is developed for cancer genetics, stochastic tunnels are general phenomena that could arise in many circumstances...
Mutation landscapesAkira Sasaki
Department of Biology, Faculty of Science, Kyushu University Graduate Schools, Fukuoka, 812-8581, Japan
J Theor Biol 224:241-7. 2003..Instead, the target of selection is an optimum distribution of mutation rates, a 'mutational quasispecies'...
Cell biology: Developmental predisposition to cancerSteven A Frank
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Irvine, California 92697-2525, USA
Nature 422:494. 2003
The significance of unstable chromosomes in colorectal cancerHarith Rajagopalan
Sidney Kimmel Comprehensive Cancer Center and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, Maryland 21231, USA
Nat Rev Cancer 3:695-701. 2003..Here, we explore experimental and theoretical evidence for the initiation of chromosomal instability in very early colorectal cancers, and reflect on the role that chromosomal instability could have in colorectal tumorigenesis...
Somatic selection for and against cancerFranziska Michor
Program in Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 225:377-82. 2003..If both deleterious and advantageous mutations participate in tumor initiation, then we find an intermediate optimum for the compartment size...
The linear process of somatic evolutionMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 100:14966-9. 2003..This design can slow down the rate of somatic evolution dramatically and therefore delay the onset of cancer...
Local regulation of homeostasis favors chromosomal instabilityFranziska Michor
Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Curr Biol 13:581-4. 2003..Thus, small compartments protect against mutations in tumor suppressor genes or oncogenes but promote the emergence of genetic instability...
Evolutionary dynamics of escape from biomedical interventionYoh Iwasa
Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812 8581, Japan
Proc Biol Sci 270:2573-8. 2003..Our theory shows how to estimate the probability of success or failure of biomedical intervention, such as drug treatment and vaccination, against rapidly evolving organisms...
Prisoners of the dilemmaMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, One Brattle Square, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Nature 427:491. 2004
Problems of somatic mutation and cancerSteven A Frank
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Irvine CA 92717, USA
Bioessays 26:291-9. 2004..We consider how various aspects of tissue architecture and cellular competition affect the pace of mutation accumulation. We also discuss the rise and fall of somatic mutation rates during cancer progression...
Bacterial game dynamicsMartin A Nowak
Nature 418:138-9. 2002
Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensityArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
Bull Math Biol 70:1410-24. 2008..This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory...
Five rules for the evolution of cooperationMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, and Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Science 314:1560-3. 2006..For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation...
Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitudeMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Biol Sci 274:605-9. 2007..Our analysis shows that gratitude and other positive emotions, which increase the willingness to help others, can evolve in the competitive world of natural selection...
Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linkingJorge M Pacheco
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev Lett 97:258103. 2006..For intermediate ranges, we investigate numerically the detailed interplay determined by these two time scales and show that the scope of validity of the analytical results extends to a much wider ratio of time scales than expected...
Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamicsArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 246:522-9. 2007..For some payoff matrices the distribution of fixation times can become so broad that the average value is no longer very meaningful...
Gambling for global goodsAnna Dreber
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology and Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 105:2261-2. 2008
Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?Lorens A Imhof
Statistische Abteilung, Universitat Bonn, D 53113 Bonn, Germany
J Theor Biol 247:574-80. 2007..TFT is never selected in this evolutionary process, but lowers the selection threshold for WSLS...
Empathy leads to fairnessKaren M Page
Bioinformatics Unit, Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, U K
Bull Math Biol 64:1101-16. 2002..Here we study the Ultimatum Game in an evolutionary context and show that empathy can lead to the evolution of fairness. Empathy means that individuals make offers which they themselves would be prepared to accept...
Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linkingJorge M Pacheco
ATP Group and CFTC, Departamento de Física da Faculdade de Ciências, P 1649 003 Lisboa Codex, Portugal
J Theor Biol 250:723-31. 2008..We derive analytical conditions for evolutionary stability...
Evolution: the good, the bad and the lonelyFranziska Michor
Nature 419:677, 679. 2002
The fastest evolutionary trajectoryArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 249:617-23. 2007..We discuss deviations for large mutation rates and including back mutations. For very large mutation rates, the optimum fitness landscape is flat and has a single peak at type B...
Quantifying the evolutionary dynamics of languageErez Lieberman
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Nature 449:713-6. 2007..Our study provides a quantitative analysis of the regularization process by which ancestral forms gradually yield to an emerging linguistic rule...
Transforming the dilemmaChristine Taylor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Evolution 61:2281-92. 2007..The transformed matrices can be used in standard frameworks of evolutionary dynamics such as the replicator equation or stochastic processes of game dynamics in finite populations...
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixationArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 74:011909. 2006....
Theory is available lightMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Curr Biol 14:R406-7. 2004
Dynamics of cancer progressionFranziska Michor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Nat Rev Cancer 4:197-205. 2004
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populationsChristine Taylor
Department of Mathematics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Bull Math Biol 66:1621-44. 2004..For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior...
Linear model of colon cancer initiationFranziska Michor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Cell Cycle 3:358-62. 2004..We study the consequences of mutations in different cell types and calculate the conditions for CIN to precede APC inactivation. We find that early emergence of CIN is very likely in colorectal tumorigenesis...
Evolutionary dynamics on graphsErez Lieberman
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Nature 433:312-6. 2005..Evolutionary graph theory has many fascinating applications ranging from ecology to multi-cellular organization and economics...
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics on two levelsArne Traulsen
Institut für Theoretische Physik und Astrophysik, Christian Albrechts Universitat, Olshausenstr 40, D 24098 Kiel, Germany
J Theor Biol 235:393-401. 2005..We also study opposing selection on two or more levels by analysing the evolutionary dynamics of hierarchically embedded Moran processes...
Dynamics of colorectal cancerFranziska Michor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Semin Cancer Biol 15:484-93. 2005..An early emergence of genetic instability could drive most of the somatic evolution of cancer. Here, we review mathematical models of colorectal tumorigenesis and discuss the role of genetic instability...
Why are phenotypic mutation rates much higher than genotypic mutation rates?Reinhard Burger
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics and Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Genetics 172:197-206. 2006..Despite its simplicity, our model can explain part of the huge difference between genotypic and phenotypic mutation rates that is observed in nature. The relevant data are summarized...
Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction ratesChristine Taylor
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Theor Popul Biol 69:243-52. 2006..For the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-uniform interaction rates allow the coexistence between cooperators and defectors. For the snowdrift game, non-uniform interaction rates change the equilibrium frequency of cooperators...
Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher processLorens A Imhof
Statistische Abteilung, Universitat Bonn, Germany
J Math Biol 52:667-81. 2006..In the limit of weak selection, we obtain the 1/3 law: if A and B are strict Nash equilibria then selection favors replacement of B by A, if the unstable equilibrium occurs at a frequency of A which is less than 1/3...
Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selectionArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Departments of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology and Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103:10952-5. 2006..The parameters b and c denote the benefit and cost of the altruistic act, whereas n and m denote the maximum group size and the number of groups. The model can be extended to more than two levels of selection and to include migration...
The replicator equation on graphsHisashi Ohtsuki
Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812 8581, Japan
J Theor Biol 243:86-97. 2006..We discuss the application of our theory to four particular examples, the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game...
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populationsMartin A Nowak
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Nature 428:646-50. 2004..We specify the conditions required for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation and define evolutionary stability in finite populations...
Patterns of cell division and the risk of cancerSteven A Frank
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Irvine, California 92697 2525, USA
Genetics 163:1527-32. 2003....
Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networksFeng Fu
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 78:026117. 2008..Our results highlight the importance of the consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on the promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships...
