Research Topics
| Christoph HauertSummaryAffiliation: Harvard University Country: USA Publications
|
Detail Information
Publications
Ecological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcationChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Theor Popul Biol 73:257-63. 2008..These results show that including population dynamics in evolutionary games can have important consequences for the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation...- Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods gamesChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Biol Sci 273:2565-70. 2006..However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities... 
Spatial effects in social dilemmasChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 240:627-36. 2006....- Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmasChristoph Hauert
Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver BC, Canada V6T 1Z4
J Theor Biol 239:195-202. 2006..Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas... - Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift gamesFeng Fu
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 266:358-66. 2010.... - Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishmentChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Science 316:1905-7. 2007..Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation... - Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selectionFeng Fu
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 79:046707. 2009..Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies... - Spatial invasion of cooperationPhilipp Langer
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
J Theor Biol 250:634-41. 2008.... - Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods gamesChristoph Hauert
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Proc Biol Sci 273:3131-2. 2006 - Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networksFeng Fu
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 78:026117. 2008..Our results highlight the importance of the consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on the promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships... - Evolutionary dynamics on graphsErez Lieberman
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Nature 433:312-6. 2005..Evolutionary graph theory has many fascinating applications ranging from ecology to multi-cellular organization and economics... - Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populationsArne Traulsen
Institut für Theoretische Physik und Astrophysik, Christian Albrechts Universitat, Olshausenstrasse 40, 24098 Kiel, Germany
Phys Rev Lett 95:238701. 2005..Moreover, differences on the individual level can lead to qualitatively different dynamics in asymmetric conflicts and, depending on the population size, can even invert the direction of the evolutionary process... - Coevolutionary dynamics in large, but finite populationsArne Traulsen
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 74:011901. 2006..This approach complements simulation results and provides a deeper, systematic understanding of coevolutionary dynamics... - Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift gameChristoph Hauert
Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
Nature 428:643-6. 2004..In particular, spatial structure eliminates cooperation if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is high. Our results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour... - Simple adaptive strategy wins the prisoner's dilemmaChristoph Hauert
Institut für Mathematik, Universität Wien Strudlhofgasse 4, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
J Theor Biol 218:261-72. 2002..e. variations of the parameter values and finally (d) superior in performance to the most prominent strategies in the literature... - A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networksHisashi Ohtsuki
Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812-8581, Japan
Nature 441:502-5. 2006..In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity... - Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods gamesChristoph Hauert
Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Science 296:1129-32. 2002..Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random... - The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectorsMichael Doebeli
Department of Zoology and Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
Science 306:859-62. 2004..Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve... - Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods gamesHannelore Brandt
, , Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Proc Biol Sci 270:1099-104. 2003..This group-beneficial result is obtained, intriguingly, by making individuals more likely to exploit their co-players if they can get away with it. Thus, less-cooperative individuals make more-cooperative societies... - Punishing and abstaining for public goodsHannelore Brandt
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103:495-7. 2006..Evolutionary dynamics can lead either to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and nonpunishing cooperators or to an oscillating state without punishers... - Replicator dynamics for optional public good gamesChristoph Hauert
Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, 1090, Vienna, Austria
J Theor Biol 218:187-94. 2002..Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game... - Primer: altruismKarl Sigmund
Math Inst. University of Vienna and Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
Curr Biol 12:R270-2. 2002