Christoph Hauert

Summary

Affiliation: University of British Columbia
Country: Canada

Publications

  1. ncbi request reprint Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
    Nature 428:643-6. 2004
  2. pmc Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver BC, Canada V6T 1Z4
    J Theor Biol 239:195-202. 2006
  3. pmc Consolidating birth-death and death-birth processes in structured populations
    Joshua Zukewich
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
    PLoS ONE 8:e54639. 2013
  4. doi request reprint Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
    J Theor Biol 299:106-12. 2012
  5. ncbi request reprint The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors
    Michael Doebeli
    Department of Zoology and Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
    Science 306:859-62. 2004
  6. pmc Shame and honour drive cooperation
    Jennifer Jacquet
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
    Biol Lett 7:899-901. 2011
  7. doi request reprint Public goods games with reward in finite populations
    Peter A I Forsyth
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
    J Math Biol 63:109-23. 2011
  8. pmc Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
    Feng Fu
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
    Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 78:026117. 2008
  9. pmc Spatial invasion of cooperation
    Philipp Langer
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    J Theor Biol 250:634-41. 2008
  10. pmc Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Science 316:1905-7. 2007

Detail Information

Publications24

  1. ncbi request reprint Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
    Nature 428:643-6. 2004
    ..In particular, spatial structure eliminates cooperation if the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is high. Our results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour...
  2. pmc Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver BC, Canada V6T 1Z4
    J Theor Biol 239:195-202. 2006
    ..Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas...
  3. pmc Consolidating birth-death and death-birth processes in structured populations
    Joshua Zukewich
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
    PLoS ONE 8:e54639. 2013
    ..Finally we show that, for any mixed BD-DB update and under weak selection, cooperation is never inhibited by population structure for any social dilemma, including the Snowdrift Game...
  4. doi request reprint Evolutionary games in deme structured, finite populations
    Christoph Hauert
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2
    J Theor Biol 299:106-12. 2012
    ..We then apply the general results to the prisoner's dilemma game and discuss selected dynamics and the conditions for cooperation to prevail...
  5. ncbi request reprint The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors
    Michael Doebeli
    Department of Zoology and Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada
    Science 306:859-62. 2004
    ..Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve...
  6. pmc Shame and honour drive cooperation
    Jennifer Jacquet
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
    Biol Lett 7:899-901. 2011
    ....
  7. doi request reprint Public goods games with reward in finite populations
    Peter A I Forsyth
    Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
    J Math Biol 63:109-23. 2011
    ..However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators...
  8. pmc Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks
    Feng Fu
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
    Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 78:026117. 2008
    ..Our results highlight the importance of the consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on the promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships...
  9. pmc Spatial invasion of cooperation
    Philipp Langer
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    J Theor Biol 250:634-41. 2008
    ....
  10. pmc Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Science 316:1905-7. 2007
    ..Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation...
  11. pmc Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Proc Biol Sci 273:3131-2. 2006
  12. pmc A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
    Hisashi Ohtsuki
    Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 812 8581, Japan
    Nature 441:502-5. 2006
    ..In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity...
  13. pmc Punishing and abstaining for public goods
    Hannelore Brandt
    Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103:495-7. 2006
    ..Evolutionary dynamics can lead either to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and nonpunishing cooperators or to an oscillating state without punishers...
  14. ncbi request reprint Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Science 296:1129-32. 2002
    ..Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random...
  15. ncbi request reprint Replicator dynamics for optional public good games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, 1090, Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 218:187-94. 2002
    ..Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game...
  16. ncbi request reprint Simple adaptive strategy wins the prisoner's dilemma
    Christoph Hauert
    Institut für Mathematik, Universität Wien Strudlhofgasse 4, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 218:261-72. 2002
    ..e. variations of the parameter values and finally (d) superior in performance to the most prominent strategies in the literature...
  17. pmc Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games
    Hannelore Brandt
    Institut für Mathematik, Universitat Wien, Strudlhofgasse 4, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Biol Sci 270:1099-104. 2003
    ..This group-beneficial result is obtained, intriguingly, by making individuals more likely to exploit their co-players if they can get away with it. Thus, less-cooperative individuals make more-cooperative societies...
  18. ncbi request reprint Primer: altruism
    Karl Sigmund
    Math Inst University of Vienna and Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
    Curr Biol 12:R270-2. 2002
  19. ncbi request reprint Spatial effects in social dilemmas
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    J Theor Biol 240:627-36. 2006
    ....
  20. ncbi request reprint Coevolutionary dynamics: from finite to infinite populations
    Arne Traulsen
    Institut für Theoretische Physik und Astrophysik, Christian Albrechts Universitat, Olshausenstrasse 40, 24098 Kiel, Germany
    Phys Rev Lett 95:238701. 2005
    ..Moreover, differences on the individual level can lead to qualitatively different dynamics in asymmetric conflicts and, depending on the population size, can even invert the direction of the evolutionary process...
  21. ncbi request reprint Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
    Erez Lieberman
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
    Nature 433:312-6. 2005
    ..Evolutionary graph theory has many fascinating applications ranging from ecology to multi-cellular organization and economics...
  22. pmc Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Proc Biol Sci 273:2565-70. 2006
    ..However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities...
  23. ncbi request reprint Coevolutionary dynamics in large, but finite populations
    Arne Traulsen
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
    Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 74:011901. 2006
    ..This approach complements simulation results and provides a deeper, systematic understanding of coevolutionary dynamics...
  24. pmc Ecological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Theor Popul Biol 73:257-63. 2008
    ..These results show that including population dynamics in evolutionary games can have important consequences for the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation...