Karl Sigmund

Summary

Affiliation: University of Vienna
Country: Austria

Publications

  1. ncbi Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Nature 466:861-3. 2010
  2. ncbi Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 299:25-30. 2012
  3. ncbi John Maynard Smith and evolutionary game theory
    Karl Sigmund
    Fakultaet fuer Mathematik, University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
    Theor Popul Biol 68:7-10. 2005
  4. ncbi Three's company when seeking unanimity
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 101:17885-6. 2004
  5. ncbi Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Trends Ecol Evol 22:593-600. 2007
  6. ncbi Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick
    Christian Hilbe
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Biol Sci 277:2427-33. 2010
  7. ncbi Replicator dynamics for optional public good games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, 1090, Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 218:187-94. 2002
  8. ncbi The good, the bad and the discriminator--errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
    Hannelore Brandt
    Fakultaet fuer Mathematik, University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
    J Theor Biol 239:183-94. 2006
  9. ncbi Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Science 296:1129-32. 2002
  10. ncbi The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
    Hannelore Brandt
    , Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Wien, Austria
    J Theor Biol 231:475-86. 2004

Detail Information

Publications18

  1. ncbi Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Nature 466:861-3. 2010
    ....
  2. ncbi Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 299:25-30. 2012
    ..Even the simplest binary assessment rules lead to complex outcomes and require considerable cognitive abilities...
  3. ncbi John Maynard Smith and evolutionary game theory
    Karl Sigmund
    Fakultaet fuer Mathematik, University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
    Theor Popul Biol 68:7-10. 2005
  4. ncbi Three's company when seeking unanimity
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 101:17885-6. 2004
  5. ncbi Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Trends Ecol Evol 22:593-600. 2007
    ....
  6. ncbi Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick
    Christian Hilbe
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Nordbergstrasse 15, A 1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Biol Sci 277:2427-33. 2010
    ..Rewarding behaviour does not become fixed, but can play an essential role in catalysing the emergence of cooperation, especially if the information level is low...
  7. ncbi Replicator dynamics for optional public good games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, 1090, Vienna, Austria
    J Theor Biol 218:187-94. 2002
    ..Thus, voluntary participation makes cooperation feasible. But for each strategy, the average payoff value remains equal to the earnings of those not participating in the public goods game...
  8. ncbi The good, the bad and the discriminator--errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
    Hannelore Brandt
    Fakultaet fuer Mathematik, University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria
    J Theor Biol 239:183-94. 2006
    ..The probability for another round (in the case of direct reciprocity), and information about the co-player (in the case of indirect reciprocity), add further elements to the ecology of reciprocation...
  9. ncbi Volunteering as Red Queen mechanism for cooperation in public goods games
    Christoph Hauert
    Institute for Mathematics, University of Vienna, Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Science 296:1129-32. 2002
    ..Cooperation can subsist in sizable groups even if interactions are not repeated, defectors remain anonymous, players have no memory, and assortment is purely random...
  10. ncbi The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
    Hannelore Brandt
    , Nordbergstrasse 15, 1090 Wien, Austria
    J Theor Biol 231:475-86. 2004
    ..The model presented here is based on three specifications: each player has a personal list of images of all co-players, a specific way of judging an observed situation, and a specific strategy to decide whether to cooperate or not...
  11. ncbi The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
    Satoshi Uchida
    Research Division, RINRI Institute, Chiyoda ku misaki cho 3 1 10, 101 0061 Tokyo, Japan
    J Theor Biol 263:13-9. 2010
    ....
  12. ncbi Karl Sigmund
    Karl Sigmund
    Faculty of Mathematics, University of Vienna and Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
    Curr Biol 14:R541. 2004
  13. ncbi Primer: altruism
    Karl Sigmund
    Math Inst. University of Vienna and Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria
    Curr Biol 12:R270-2. 2002
  14. ncbi Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment
    Christoph Hauert
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Science 316:1905-7. 2007
    ..Paradoxically, the freedom to withdraw from the common enterprise leads to enforcement of social norms. Joint enterprises that are compulsory rather than voluntary are less likely to lead to cooperation...
  15. ncbi Punishing and abstaining for public goods
    Hannelore Brandt
    Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103:495-7. 2006
    ..Evolutionary dynamics can lead either to a Nash equilibrium of punishing and nonpunishing cooperators or to an oscillating state without punishers...
  16. ncbi Evolutionary dynamics of biological games
    Martin A Nowak
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 1 Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
    Science 303:793-9. 2004
    ..Evolutionary game theory is an essential component of a mathematical and computational approach to biology...
  17. ncbi Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games
    Hannelore Brandt
    , , Strudlhofgasse 4, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
    Proc Biol Sci 270:1099-104. 2003
    ..This group-beneficial result is obtained, intriguingly, by making individuals more likely to exploit their co-players if they can get away with it. Thus, less-cooperative individuals make more-cooperative societies...
  18. ncbi Evolution of indirect reciprocity
    Martin A Nowak
    Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA
    Nature 437:1291-8. 2005
    ..The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands...